In this context, it is important to ensure that the licence does not contain severe competition restrictions set out in the TTBE. The existence of such restrictions is extremely difficult to justify under Article 101, paragraph 3, and should nullify the entire licence and expose the parties to the risk of fines and actions for damages from third parties. The restrictions of a DPI licence between competitors under the TTBE include: other types of subcontracting between competitors (designated by the Commission as subcontractors for production expansion, for example, agreements for the manufacture of products based on materials based on hand-based materials. B-work), are not covered by the category exemption, but similar principles apply under the guidelines. The Commission`s contracting notice7 may also be important. Competition law defines certain behaviours that are expressly prohibited. These include agreements that: the content and practice of competition law vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Protecting the interests of consumers (consumer well-being) and ensuring that entrepreneurs have the opportunity to compete in a market economy are often seen as important objectives. Competition law is closely linked to the law on the deregulation of market access, state aid and subsidies, the privatization of public assets and the establishment of independent regulators in the sector, including supply-making measures. In recent decades, competition law has been seen as a means of providing better public services. [10] Robert Bork argued that competition law could have negative effects if they reduced competition by protecting inefficient competitors and if the cost of state of law intervention was higher than the benefits to consumers. [11] These agreements may have been concluded for apparently valid commercial reasons, but may be contrary to competition law because of their anti-competitive effect.

These limited situations proposed by the Commission could be used to justify an information exchange agreement which, on the face of it, is contrary to Article 101, paragraph 1, is not always applicable (most of the information exchanged between competitors is not published) or does not reflect the sole or main reason for the exchange of information (it seems unlikely that stronger competitors will want to reveal the reasons for their success to their less successful competitors). to catch up). The Commission`s proposals highlight the difficulties in applying Article 101, paragraph 3, in this context. Competitors considering an information exchange agreement are therefore more likely to escape competition problems by ensuring that their agreement cannot be characterized as anti-competitive than to justify it as consumer-friendly. As far as competition law is concerned, these agreements should be considered “for the purpose” of infringements and should be considered anti-competitive, whether or not they have anti-competitive effects. In theory, such an exchange could still be justified under section 101, paragraph 3, but it is unlikely to be exempted, since they are generally linked to price or quantity agreements.